M. T. Dalgarno; XII*—Analysing Hobbes's Contract, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 76, Issue 1, 1 June 1976, Pages 209–226, https://doi.org/10.10.

The identity of the river S0009838800019376_inline1 is even more obscure than that of the S0009838800019376_inline2 . Strabo and Dionysius Periegetes alone mention a Peloponnesian river of the name.

II is Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, grec suppl. 1095;2 foll. 280, cmm. 33, 5X22, 8, with forty lines to the page; cent. late XV. Contents: f. Ir, Life of Homer. Iv–24v, Plutarch's dissertation on Homer. 25–222r, Iliad, with scholia. 223–4, blank. 225r–245r, Homeric Hymns III.–XXXIII. ; then the epigram єἰς ξἑνονς.4 245r an epigram on Callimachus' works, which runs thus in this manuscript:ϒμνῶ тὸν νΨίζνчоν ἐν πρώτоις δία.Фоῖβоν δ' ἓπειтα кαὶ тρίтην тὴν ἄρтεμιν.δῆλоν тεтὰρтην εἶтα λоʋтρὰ παλάδоς.ἒктην δὲ τὴν тήμηтραν Тὴν (...) παλαιТέραν.μέλπω δὲ γραὸς τῆς Фιλоξένоν Тρόπη.кαὶ Тὴν ТελενТέαν Тὲ Тὴν ἄγραν.кαὶ Тῶν μεγίσТων αἰТίων Тὴν ТεТράδα.σкώπТω δ' ἱπ' ἀραῖς ἴβоν ἀπоλλῴνιоνкαὶ Тὴν ἀθηνᾶν ѷσТαТоν μέλπω πάλινγρίФω βαθίσТω кαὶ δνσενρήТоισ λόγоισ. (shrink)

If every concept ist not, in trivial terms, to have a content, then the content of a concept has to be understood as the set of all concepts that it contains , the concept itself and the tautological concept being excepted. Since a negated concept can only include, in terms of content, the negations of the special concepts, the negated individual concepts are consequently without content . The individual concept, whose content is the sufficient condition for establishing a possible individual (...) as extension, is indispensable if Leibniz's theses are to be upheld: equality of extent is also always equality of content. The intensional conceptual estimation can also be extensionally interpreted. Conceptual negations are however indispensable if a Spinozistic monism is to be avoided and a multitude of the most general elementary concepts obtained. (shrink)

``What Does a Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide (PAS) Legallyentail?''''Much of the bioethics literature focuses on the morality ofPAS but ignores the legal implications of the conclusions thereby wrought. Specifically, what does a legal right toPAS entail both on the part of the physician and the patient? Iargue that we must begin by distinguishing a right to PAS qua``external'''' to a particular physician-patient relationship from a right to PAS qua ``internal'''' to a particular physician-patientrelationship. The former constitutes a negative claim right (...) inrem that prohibits outside interference with the exercise of aright to PAS while the latter can provide the patient witha positive claim right in personam to obligatory assistancefrom his physician. Importantly, I argue that the creation of sucha patient right, however, originates with the physician who may exercise an unqualified right of first refusal prior to promisingto help her patient commit suicide. In doing so, I hope to establishthat explicit physician promises of assistance in dying shouldbecome legally binding. As such, current PAS law in both theNetherlands and Oregon is in need of substantive modification. (shrink)